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Abstract
The effective and efficient management of diversified business firms that supply multiple
products and operate in multiple, dynamic markets, especially large multinational
enterprises (MNEs), builds upon a number of specific governance principles. These
governance principles allow aligning environmental characteristics, strategy and
organization. Given the rising need to ‘learn from the world’, Doz et al. (2001) in their
influential Harvard Business School Press book entitled ‘From Global to Metanational’,
have proposed a new set of governance principles described under the ‘metanational’
umbrella concept. This paper revisits the metanational, using a comparative institutional
perspective; here we contrast multidivisional and metanational governance principles. A
comparative institutional analysis suggests that the metanational’s application potential in
terms of actually improving the effectiveness and efficiency of MNE governance may be
subject to more qualification than suggested by Doz et al. (2001).

Senior MNE

management must therefore reflect carefully before substituting metanational governance
principles for the more conventional, multidivisional ones with established contributions to
managerial effectiveness and efficiency.

Keywords: comparative institutional analysis, internalization theory, multidivisional
governance, multinational enterprise, global strategy.
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Introduction
In Strategy and Structure, Alfred Chandler (1998, first edition 1962) provides a
monumental and unparalleled description of the challenges faced by large, multi-product
firms operating in dynamic environments when attempting to align properly environmental
characteristics, strategy and organization. Chandler reports that in the early 1920s, a few
large firms pursuing strategies of product diversification, namely General Motors (GM) and
DuPont, simultaneously - but independently of each other - crafted a new approach to their
internal governance, i.e., the ways in which rights and responsibilities are shared among the
various corporate participants, with the view to achieve a more effective and efficient
alignment of their organization with environmental and strategy characteristics. This new
line of governance has become known as the multidivisional approach to organization.
During the early 1920s, each company reorganized from conventional functional or unitary
governance to multidivisional governance: GM’s transformation was brought on by the
American auto market collapse and a related inventory crisis.

DuPont’s change was

brought on by its dire financial state during the first two quarters of 1920, whereby, during
these six months of severe postwar recession, only the explosives business had remained
profitable. Though Standard Oil and Sears followed shortly thereafter, only a handful of
companies had adopted multidivisional governance principles by the end of the 1930s
(Chandler, 1998). After World War II, however, most large and diversified American and
European companies adopted these principles (Whittington & Mayer, 2000). Even though
imitation effects (especially within industries) may have played a role in early adoption, it
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was largely the recognition of the improved effectiveness and efficiency properties of this
new governance form that led to its widespread diffusion in the longer run.
In the 1960s, Harvard’s Multinational Enterprise Project, studying the international
expansion of US-based companies, defined a multinational enterprise (MNE), as a firm
with an equity stake of at least 25% in production facilities in at least six countries. A
presence in at least six countries reflected of course substantial geographic diversification
and therefore high environmental complexity. The Harvard project signaled the rapid
growth of MNEs in developed economies, and their expansion globally, a phenomenon best
described by Vernon’s (1966) influential product life cycle theory with innovations
developed in the US home-base, being systematically diffused internationally. Importantly,
this expansion towards multiple geographic markets was accompanied by the development
of novel organizational approaches, all of them of the multidivisional type (creation of an
international division, product divisions, geographic divisions or a mix thereof, etc.), see
inter alia, Fouraker and Stopford (1968), Stopford and Wells (1972) and Franko (1976).
Franko’s insightful analysis of continental European MNEs found an evolutionary pattern
of organizational forms different from the one prevailing in the United States and the
United Kingdom, and a comparatively higher use of personal relationships in internal
organization as opposed to more formal coordination mechanisms, but the end result was
also a multidivisional approach. By the late 1980s, MNEs (defined in this paper simply as
firms with operations in more than one country) had established a key role for themselves
in the world economy, with most of the largest ones espousing multidivisional governance
principles:
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“Collectively, [MNEs] account for over 40 percent of the world’s manufacturing output and
almost a quarter of world trade. About 85 percent of the world’s vehicles, 70 percent of the
computers, 35 percent of the toothpaste and 65 percent of soft drinks are produced and
marketed by [MNEs].” (Ghoshal and Westney, 1993, p.21)
In the 1980s, a series of new MNE governance models began to appear. Several
researchers suggested a shift from either a global or multi-domestic governance approach to
a combination of both (Ghoshal and Westney, 1993). A global approach typically revolved
around product divisions, whereas a multidomestic approach typically entailed the presence
of geographic divisions and/or a portfolio of relatively independent national units. In the
academic and practitioner literature, various new models were articulated, including the
‘transnational’ (Bartlett, 1986), the multi-focus firm (Prahalad & Doz, 1987), the
heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986) and the horizontal organization (White & Poynter, 1990).
These studies, which focused more on process issues, and advocated the infusion of
network and voluntary execution elements in MNE organization as substitutes for
hierarchical elements, were critical of conventional multidivisional governance, especially
when structured around product divisions, in terms of its strong emphasis on formalized,
top-down decision making and its alleged, limited dispersion of strategic entrepreneurial
capabilities throughout the company (the best known critical study being Bartlett and
Ghoshal’s 1989 analysis of the ‘transnational’). But in spite of their critical tone, almost
universally, all these studies accepted explicitly or implicitly five general governance
principles, which can be considered the conventional multidivisional governance principles,
aimed at aligning environmental characteristics, strategy and organization in large,
diversified companies supplying multiple product lines and serving multiple, dynamic
markets.
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The first principle prescribes a particular specialization in decision-making by
corporate headquarters (CHQ) and the divisions. CHQ make fundamental decisions on the
firm’s boundaries, broadly determine resource allocation among divisions and set up a
monitoring apparatus, but they self-impose restraint on their direct intervention in business
matters in divisions (whether product divisions, geographic divisions or a combination
thereof), irrespective of the studied firm’s nationality and administrative heritage, at least as
compared to the level of intervention prevalent in conventional, functionally organized
companies. In practice, CHQ intervention in divisions (or for that matter, in smaller
subunits such as national subsidiaries or specialized affiliates), may stretch selectively
beyond determining divisional product/market scope, resource allocation and monitoring,
for example when required by a crisis situation or to effect strategic integration among
divisions, when these have overlapping but conflicting interests that cannot be resolved in a
decentralized fashion (e.g., through agreed upon transfer prices or joint decision-making by
the divisions themselves). Here, it should be remembered that multidivisional governance
itself was in several instances first introduced as a response to a crisis situation. Firm-level
crises are often associated with reduced barriers to change, i.e., lower resistance to change
by powerful stakeholders (e.g., functional groups inside the organization), and with senior
management’s willingness to rise to the challenge and to take the risk of implementing a
new set of governance principles. Crisis situations facing the entire firm typically lead to
more centralization of power. In contrast, a favorable external environment (e.g., fast
industry growth) combined with substantial slack resources in the divisions, may foster
participative decentralization and increased divisional decision-making autonomy.
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The second principle prescribes selectivity in inter-divisional interactions. CHQ
and divisional management accept that the effective unbundling of the firm into specific
divisions places at least some limits on how much divisions should communicate/interact
among each other, ànd with CHQ, though rich opportunities may obviously arise and
should be pursued selectively, for intra-firm coordination, as well as for sharing of
organization-wide knowledge and best practices, thereby achieving common learning
trajectories and economies of scope across divisions.
The third principle prescribes the use of standardized, quantitative monitoring and
incentive systems. CHQ adopt at least some standardized, quantitative measurement tools
(largely based on accounting data) to evaluate divisional performance in a quasi-arm’s
length matter, sometimes complemented selectively with adjustment mechanisms to
address differences in divisions’ environmental context and strategic trajectories, as well as
with a substantial arsenal of formal rules and socialization mechanisms, especially in cases
of related diversification.
The fourth principle, which is important in rapidly changing environments,
prescribes specific roles for CHQ and the divisions in general innovation strategy. Here,
CHQ set at least some boundaries on what constitutes acceptable innovation content
(thereby defining the firm’s critical capabilities and the evolution thereof), followed by
substantial divisional autonomy to innovate within these boundaries. This principle
represents the functional application of the first principle above (specialization of CHQ and
the divisions) to the area of innovation. Adhering to this principle is critical in dynamic
environments, as it guarantees that innovation content be created by those actors best
positioned to understand changes in relevant technologies and markets, but subject to the
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constraints of maintaining intra-divisional coherence, especially in terms of ability to link
innovation activities with production, and with more downstream activities such as
marketing. Such divisional specialization in entire, innovation-driven value chains reduces
coordination costs in terms of figuring out which innovations ultimately make commercial
sense. It also puts skilled experts with deep knowledge of innovation-driven value chains
in charge of all the functional activities involved thereby increasing the probability of value
creation.
Finally, the fifth principle, again relevant particularly in dynamic environments,
prescribes a particular management of the tension that may arise between incremental and
disruptive innovation. Here, CHQ and divisional management accept that the bulk of the
innovation efforts in the firm should reflect incremental innovation (in line with the firm’s
dominant logic) and should be concentrated inside the divisions. Valuable ‘autonomous
initiatives’ reflecting more disruptive innovation, outside the scope of preset innovation
boundaries, may arise in the divisions, especially on the basis of market or technological
opportunities identified by individuals operating on the ‘front-line’ and in the ‘periphery’,
but in order to bring such initiatives to fruition, a ‘divisional home’, whether in an
established unit or new unit must be found for the innovation, or a spin-off must be
organized to bring it to the market. In select cases, autonomous projects with large resource
requirements that do not fit into any divisional portfolio and are associated with high risk
may be pursued by CHQ themselves. Here, CHQ embark on a process that will change
what is viewed in the firm as acceptable innovation and prepare the stage themselves for an
altered dominant logic of the corporation.
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We shall discuss some of the antecedents and implications of the above principles in
the next section, but it is important to emphasize that respecting the dynamic selectivity
embedded in them is critical to the relative effectiveness and efficiency of internal
governance vis-à-vis the market (i.e., de-internalization). We use the term dynamic
selectivity to make the simple point that any corporation is characterized by needs for
specialization and subsequent integration routines, which impose restrictions on the
content, volume and timing of interactions among corporate participants, but such
selectivity in interactions is itself subject to adaptation in function of the level of
environmental turbulence and the firm-level strategic trajectory.
Obviously, there is more to governance than the principles outlined above: in
particular, mechanisms such as the socialization of employees, the use of procedural justice
elements, the increased adoption of modern information and communications technology
(ICT) and other management innovations may allow increased interactions among divisions
and between divisions and CHQ without loss of effectiveness and efficiency, but this
precisely reflects dynamic selectivity and does not invalidate the above governance
principles, such as the prescription of comparatively lower inter-divisional interactions than
intra-divisional ones, and self-imposed limits to CHQ intervention in the day-to-day
operations of divisions, see Hill (1985), Shanley (1996), Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber
(2000), and Eisenmann and Bower (2000) for some of the more enlightening and amusing
discussions of multidivisional governance.
Without, in our view, ever credibly challenging the validity of the above five
principles, the ‘new models’ on MNE governance arising in the 1980s and 1990s did lead
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to considerable debate regarding the (changing) nature of MNEs. Doz and Prahalad (1993)
speculated:
“It is therefore not even clear that the search for a stable organizational theory of the
[MNE] is warranted. Perhaps researchers ought to satisfy themselves with addressing an
evolving agenda of managerial issues created by changes in conditions for the success of
[MNEs] and by the evolving technologies for their management.” (Doz and Prahalad, 1993,
p.50)
One such changing condition, faced by all MNEs is the requirement for continuous
innovation, especially in the context of ‘triad power’, with large MNEs from NorthAmerica, the European Union and Asia attempting to penetrate each other’s home region
markets and driving the commodification of products previously considered innovative and
unique (Ohmae, 1985; Rugman, 2005). The resulting, systematic process of creative
destruction, somewhat similar to the one described by Schumpeter (1934) is both a
powerful and threatening force. In the more general strategic management context,
Christensen (1997) found compelling evidence of the extreme hazards resulting from
ignoring emerging innovations. Christensen discusses the managerial dilemma of adopting
and/or fostering nascent and potentially promising innovations inside the firm, given the
often observed disinterest on the part of existing customers, and high priority resource
allocation processes that encourage senior managers to abandon novel business ideas
(Christensen, 1997).
Irrespective of the particular innovation route chosen, MNEs do need to engage in
new initiatives in order to sustain competitive advantage against large, especially triadbased rivals from North-America, the European Union or Asia. Most MNEs, even if they
occupy a dominant position in their home region, are actually much smaller players in host
triad markets, see Rugman and Verbeke (2004, 2005a, 2007) and Rugman (2005) for an in-
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depth analysis. This implies that their overall market position is usually contestable, even
in the short run. MNEs must therefore continuously obtain new resources and recombine
them with current ones (McGrath, MacMillan & Venkataraman, 1995). Here, the key
managerial challenge is the choice of a governance approach to facilitate this continuous
sequence of knowledge development/ acquisition, absorption, diffusion and exploitation in
an effective and efficient fashion (Rugman and Verbeke, 2002).
Given the above context, Doz et al. (2001) have proposed a new conceptual model,
namely the metanational approach, as the optimal governance alternative for MNEs facing
opportunities of accessing new knowledge cropping up around the world, and seeking to
transform these opportunities into economically viable operations. The purpose of this
paper is to assess the metanational approach to governance, using a comparative
institutional perspective. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next
section, we briefly examine modern, comparative institutional thinking, with a focus on
transaction cost/ internalization (TCI) theory and we compare the key principles
characterizing multidivisional and metanational governance. In the third section, we use
TCI theory as the basis of a critical analysis of the proposed metanational governance
approach. Section four concludes.

Transaction Cost/ Internalization (TCI) theory: multidivisional versus metanational
governance
The application of comparative institutional thinking to the MNE has been
articulated most clearly in TCI theory, see Buckley and Casson (1976), Hennart (1982) and
Rugman (1981). TCI theory is an evolving theoretical framework used mainly to determine
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the most effective and efficient governance form for a set of specific transactions conducted
by the MNE, within a broader economic and institutional context. Here, appropriate
internal governance, in the form of comparatively lower costs of negotiating, monitoring
and enforcing terms and conditions of exchange relative to market contracting, building
upon Coase (1937), is a significant source of value. Though grounded in transaction cost
economics (TCE) reasoning, TCI thinking has been developed in parallel with - but largely
independently of - more mainstream TCE thinking, as articulated by Williamson (1985,
1996). Both strands of comparative institutional analysis largely build upon similar
parameters to determine MNE governance choices, even though Williamson espouses a
particularly narrow view of (proprietary) knowledge management and innovation, building
upon the asset specificity concept, and he neglects the impact of geography on governance
choices.
MNEs operate in an economic environment characterized by uncertainty and
complexity. Here, foreign locations are attractive relative to the home country for the
deployment of specific economic activities, but these locations also lead to challenges of
managing ‘distance’ (cultural, administrative, geographic and economic), see Ghemawat
(2001). Given this environmental context, international business decisions are driven by
three key factors: bounded rationality economizing, bounded reliability economizing (with
opportunism as one possible expression of bounded reliability), and the need to create a
favorable organizational context, i.e. an internal environment and an interface with the
external environment, for knowledge management and innovation in its entirety, i.e., for the
full process of knowledge development/acquisition, absorption, diffusion and exploitation.
We briefly discuss these three concepts in Appendix 1, in the context of the MNE.
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Multidivisional governance is generally considered the standard, i.e. the
comparatively more effective and efficient governance approach for large, diversified
MNEs, meaning the governance form that to the best of our knowledge, and subject to
proper implementation, better allows economizing on bounded rationality and bounded
reliability, and creating value from knowledge management, at least as compared to
conventional, functional governance. As noted above, it replaced the less satisfying
functional governance approach, characterized by centralized decision-making and
functionally departmentalized operations such as R&D, production and marketing.
Williamson (1971) submits the following statement from IBM’s executive office in 1956
concerning its transformation:
“…the new alignment of the various areas is based on products. Each of the product
divisions will, within the framework of policy established by the Board of Directors and
general management, operate almost as an individual company with its own manufacturing,
sales and service functions. Each of these divisions is equipped with special skills and
product knowledge to concentrate on developing the full potential of a specific market.
Further strength is given the organization with the creation of the corporate staff, which,
being separate from the operating organization responsible for developing, producing,
selling and servicing goods, can closely examine the special areas of the business and assist
the operating executives in solving problems in these areas. (I.B.M. Business Machines, 28
Dec 1956)”(Williamson, 1971, p.382-383).
Functional governance had several advantages for firms with limited product
ranges. Senior managers could dictate the operations of functional areas, easily relocate
skills amongst subunits, diagnose and repair problems within specific functional areas.
Unfortunately, managers struggled to coordinate functional subunit interactions.

For

example, functional subunit managers were prone to hiring duplicate experts to solve
external market problems. In addition, Chandler (1998, p. 382-383) states: “…the
administrative load on the senior executives increased to such an extent that they were
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unable to handle their entrepreneurial responsibility efficiently.” Problems of bounded
rationality reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of unitary governance.
With multidivisional governance, those bounded rationality problems facing senior
executives were reduced, since quasi-autonomous operating divisions took the place of
inter-reliant, functional areas. Senior executives at CHQ focused comparatively more on
setting strategic direction in terms of broad product/market scope boundaries, allocating
resources among divisions, and monitoring divisional performance. Multidivisional
governance also (unintentionally) allowed economizing on bounded reliability, as it
mitigated the earlier problems associated with subgoal pursuit by functional managers in
unitary governance through standardized controls and incentives.

It also reduced

unproductive and costly communication among actors responsible for very different
products and markets (costs that obviously depended on the relatedness / interdependencies
among divisions). Finally, multidivisional governance greatly facilitated adjustment to
changes in the external environment, as it became possible to shed and add divisions
without upsetting the entire organization.
Williamson (1971) described the key improvements of multidivisional governance
as follows:


“The responsibility for operating decisions is assigned to [essentially self contained]
operating divisions or ‘quasi firms’.
 The elite staff attached to the general office performs both advisory and auditing
functions. Both have the effect of securing greater control over operating-division
behavior.
 The general office is principally concerned with strategic decisions involving planning,
appraisal and control, including the allocation of resources among the [competing]
operating divisions.
 The separation of the general office from the operations provides general office
executives with the psychological commitment to be concerned with the overall
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performance of the organization rather than become absorbed in the affairs of the
functional parts.
 The resulting structure displays both rationality and synergy: the whole is greater [more
efficient] than the sum of the parts.” (Williamson, 1971, p. 353-354)

In contrast, the foundation of the metanational approach is that environmental
changes occurring outside the firm are now forcing MNEs in most industries and countries
to revisit fundamentally the multidivisional governance principles. Doz et al. (2001) depict
an emergent, global knowledge economy within which firms must access increasingly
scattered knowledge to build or sustain competitive advantage. Corporations that tap into
“knowledge that languishes underexploited” will be “tomorrow’s winners” (Doz. et al.,
2001, p.1). Unfortunately, according to these authors, in practice most MNEs overlook or
fail to consider abundant pockets of valuable technologies and limit their knowledge
seeking efforts to a few Silicon Valley-type ‘hot spots’.
Metanational governance is substantially different from that of the multidivisional
firm. Rather than building upon the fundamental distinction between CHQ and divisions,
with several possible variations on the theme, metanational governance is designed around
three distinct, but connected activity levels: sensing, mobilizing and operations. Sensing
means proactively searching for emerging knowledge that will build or sustain the firm.
Through sensing, the MNE identifies and accesses innovative technologies early on, in
order to stay ahead of competitors. Sensors are typically set up by CHQ, based on novel
insights from the CEO or other top managers (see e.g., Doz et al., p.146 and following).
Sensors are ‘loose and flexible networks’ with flat structures, preferably manned with local
insiders and external alliance parties with privileged access to local knowledge (e.g., about
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lead customers), rather than expatriates. They can even take the form of a venture capital
fund, attracting entrepreneurs in search of funding (Doz. et al., 2001, p. 157).
To achieve mobilizing, Doz et al. (2001, p. 8) prescribe setting up magnets, which
“translate new knowledge into innovative products or specific market opportunities.”
Magnets can either be permanent or temporary, and can be structured virtually and/or
physically (e.g., located at a lead customer site). CHQ senior management is charged with
staffing magnets with entrepreneurial people who are comfortable in uncertain and
changing environments. Given their role of moving and recombining knowledge, they are
really idea brokers. CHQ must also provide capital to fund new venture projects and create
an effective culture, incentives and reward structure to motivate magnet employees.
Finally, the operations level of the metanational is reminiscent of the divisions in a
traditional multidivisional company. This level is supposed to bring innovative solutions to
market more effectively and efficiently than competitors. Here, the main role of CHQ is to
ensure that radical innovations are transferred effectively from magnets to operations
centers.
From a comparative institutional perspective, the question is whether metanational
governance is better than conventional multidivisional governance - or alternatively,
market-based governance - at economizing on bounded rationality and bounded reliability,
and at creating an appropriate organizational context for knowledge management and
innovation in its entirety. The comparison with (external) market governance is important.
It implies simply that even if metanational governance allows reaping benefits beyond the
reach of multidivisional governance, problems of internal, managerial coordination and
control may still dictate de-internalization, and thereby the use of the (external) price
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mechanism, as the main governance tool. Below, we apply TCI theory as a conceptual lens
for a comparative evaluation of multidivisional and metanational governance.
Table 1 compares multidivisional and metanational governance, in terms of
adherence to the five key principles outlined above, or absence thereof: specialization in
decision-making; selectivity in interdivisional interactions; incentive systems; general
innovation strategy; managing the tension between incremental and disruptive innovation.
Table 1 mentions only divisions as subunits, but in MNEs the concept of subunit might
actually refer to any affiliate operating as a quasi-autonomous profit-unit (especially
national subsidiaries and small product-based affiliates).

--------------------------------Table 1 (about here)
---------------------------------

Critical analysis of metanational governance
Table 1 shows that metanational governance is quite distinct from multidivisional
governance at various levels. As we note below, CHQ executives as well as managers
active in magnets, sensors and operating divisions face comparatively strong challenges of
bounded rationality economizing, bounded reliability economizing and the creation of an
appropriate organizational context for innovation in its entirety.
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Specialization in decision-making
In contrast to the case of multidivisional governance, with CHQ limiting their
involvement in day-to-day divisional operations, the CHQ in the metanational are actively
involved in setting up sensing units and “managing by walking about the world” (Doz et
al., 2001, p. 141).

A sensing unit needs to “have a direct reporting line to the top

management team… [and] be nurtured and directed by those who set the company’s longterm goals” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 165). Similarly, CHQ must go through great efforts to
select and structure magnets (Doz et al. 2001, p. 180). In the metanational, substantial
decision-making authority is transferred from conventional divisions ànd CHQ to magnets:
“Magnet teams will be the powerhouses of tomorrow’s metanational organizations. Many
such teams will operate simultaneously, each one charged with mobilizing knowledge
scattered around the world to create innovative products, services or processes. Together,
this clutch of magnet teams will form a new suborganization...[in the firm]” Doz et al.
(2001, p. 187)

Thus, sensor and magnet employees are likely to command sufficient valuable
information to change significantly the strategic direction of the MNE for better or for
worse. This does not necessarily imply the danger of purposeful deceit, but sensor and
magnet employees can be expected to exhibit systematic allegiance to the projects for
which they have been made responsible, rather than to the more conventional, induced
projects arising at the operations level. In addition, given that magnet and sensor
employees have the flexibility and autonomy to pursue activities not subject to traditional
success/failure criteria (see below), they may be prone to describing rather positively the
(often non-quantifiable) opportunities they have identified as well as their past
accomplishments, in order to secure funding and to sustain the activities they command.
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The outcome is a new bounded reliability challenge, without necessarily equivalent benefits
to the MNE. Here, sensor and magnet employees may exploit to their own benefit the
bounded rationality constraints faced by CHQ (with comparatively little insight on the
projects pursued by the sensors and magnets), and the related participative decentralization
they enjoy themselves, as the company comes to rely more heavily on them for its future
growth (see Freeland, 1996 for an analysis of the participative decentralization
phenomenon).
CHQ may need to engage in rather heavy-handed intervention so as to link the
outputs of sensors/magnets with the operations level. According to Doz et al. (2001, p. 110)
the initial separation between sensors/magnets and the operations level is necessary
because “the rules of the game for an efficient operating network are fundamentally
different from those required to access, mobilize and innovate using new knowledge that is
dispersed around the globe.” Operations divisions simply are not up to this challenge (Doz
et al., 2001, p. 162). It then becomes the task of CHQ to “create a receptive environment
for these bottom-up entrepreneurial insights”, by engaging in activities such as “facilitating
chance encounters” among individuals who would not normally meet each other in a
conventional divisionalized setting, by setting “challenging but fuzzy goals”, and by
“creating a corporate knowledge map” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 172-173). The problem with
such coordination mechanisms is that they do not constitute a valid substitute for the
necessary, permanent R&D-production-marketing linkages found in a typical division
under multidivisional governance, as a precondition for effective, internal knowledge
management and innovation in its entirety. Creating such linkages ex post (after the actual
innovation activity has taken place, and without prior operations’ level buy-in) is likely to
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require continuous, extensive CHQ intervention rather than restrained, selective
intervention at the operations level.
Selectivity in inter-divisional interactions
The two additional levels of organization, sensors and magnets, report both to each
other and to the CHQ. Once valuable innovations have been identified and made concrete,
sensors and magnets must also engage in extensive interaction with the operating affiliates
charged with producing and selling their new products and services. One positive
interpretation of this approach is that the metanational, like an octopus, can extend its reach
in multiple directions and attach itself to multiple things. But it is unclear how effective and
efficient such an organization could be. It involves new business units (some of which may
not even be completely internalized) that are explicitly meant to disrupt routinized
communication flows and value creation processes. It thrives on an unproven ability to
absorb and exploit tacit knowledge created in a variety of peripheral places in the world.
And, it relies on the free and willing participation of conventional operations level
managers, a group largely focused on specific performance metrics based on proven
products, in bringing completely new ideas to market. For example, even in the rather
simple case (technologically speaking) of the record company PolyGram, the transfer of
knowledge to operations occurs because the magnets’ staff “visit local subsidiaries, train
local staff, participate in the preparation of local sales and marketing plans, and create
concert tours….” (Doz et al., 2001, p.75), i.e., are heavily involved at the operations level.
But the use of transfer prices for such knowledge sharing and exchange among units is
flatly rejected:
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“Generally, it will not be possible to measure the direct profitability of a site. Any profit
measure would depend on the artifice of transfer prices between sites within the
metanational operations network. In most cases, these transfer prices would be highly
arbitrary, as externally verifiable market values for a site’s contribution will be impossible
to find.” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 204)
Rather, Doz et al. (2001, p. 204) propose as substitutes for transfer prices that
exchange of knowledge should occur voluntarily and freely, and individual sites would
thereby benefit from building a reputation for ‘reliability’ and ‘willingness to contribute as
a partner in the operations network’. In other words, no clear criteria are established to
guide selectivity in interunit interactions, thereby making severe bounded reliability
problems likely.
Incentive systems for subunits
A subject of great interest is the design of an appropriate incentive system for
organizational units, whether divisions or smaller subunits. With multidivisional
governance, each division is monitored and rewarded at least partly based on quantifiable
output measures (e.g., based on profit margins), which are applied consistently, but with the
possibility of selective adaptation to the external environment and strategic trajectory of
specific divisions. Doz et al. (2001, p. 193) reject this approach: the metanational “should
link a significant proportion of total staff incentives to the overall performance of the
company…as opposed to narrowly defined geographical or business-unit performance”. It
is true that the MNE under multidivisional governance is more than an internal market,
whence the possibility of adapting incentives to the environmental context and strategic
trajectory faced by specific units, but only to the extent that the resulting, added challenges
of managerial control do not make de-internalization (and the use of the external pricemechanism) a more attractive option.
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In contrast, in the metanational, CHQ executives are likely to face great difficulties
monitoring and equitably rewarding sensor and magnet operations. According to the
metanational governance principles, sensor and magnet employees are expected to act as
entrepreneurs funded with venture capital and rewarded as ‘explorers’, motivating them to
search the world for new knowledge, whereas individuals at the operations level should get
so-called ‘farmer’s rewards and punishments’, thus leading to two very different incentive
systems whereby “each type of activity requires its own performance measurement and
incentive system” (Doz et al. 2001, p. 99). For example, the performance assessment for a
sensing unit should be based on the “ratio of learning per investment”, and may include
parameters such as the “number of innovations to which it contributes”, but this is rather
vague (Doz et al., 2001, p. 166), especially in light of Doz et al.’s (2001. p. 192) strong
view noted above that metanationals must operate under a system of “zero transfer prices
for knowledge…so that cash or profit credits do not change hands when knowledge is
shared.” (Doz et al., 2001, p 192).
But corporate venturing approaches in large organizations are often hard to sustain.
According to Siegel et al. (1988), corporate venture capitalists must be given substantial
autonomy and guaranteed access to capital in order to generate both strategic benefits and
acceptable returns on investment. In addition, entrepreneurially minded employees,
originally hired to explore and eventually exploit new technologies, may self-select out of
the corporate environment for a variety of reasons, especially the likely bureaucratic load of
rules and procedures, once the innovation process reaches the production stage and the
operations level. Internal organizational problems may rise because sensor performance is
hard to monitor directly by observing behavior or through output measures. Incentives and
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reward structures may need to resemble a venture capital model, but this is difficult to
implement due to their asymmetry with what prevails in the rest of the firm (Siegel et al.,
1988).
At the magnet level, each magnet unit also consists of entrepreneurially-minded
individuals, who are financed (sustained) by internal venture-style funds. Magnet life spans
and jobs may be temporary and decisions to liquidate/move a magnet can be made
unilaterally by CHQ. Internal monitoring and reward challenges may thus increase for the
same reasons as above regarding the sensor level. Doz et al. (2001, p. 61-62) acknowledge
themselves, in the context of the firm STMicroelectronics, with its magnet units set up as a
separate organization: “This organization was not subject to the tyranny of P&L accounts,
and it was effectively ring-fenced from the other measurement tools and mechanisms that
ST used to manage the efficiency of its operations”.
At the operations level, each division is monitored and rewarded based on
quantifiable outputs (e.g., profit margins as with multidivisional governance). The
complication is the operations level’s loss of autonomy: CHQ determine which ‘outputs’
from the sensor and magnet levels must be taken on board by specific units at the
operations level. This means divisional performance results directly from CHQ decisions,
rather than from divisional choices. The absence of selectivity/restraint in CHQ
interventions, makes subsequent objective assessment of the operations level performance
particularly challenging.
Bounded reliability problems may increase because of a (perceived) lack of
procedural justice and related internal dissonance. These challenges are compounded by
the bounded rationality problems facing CHQ when making resource allocation decisions
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solely based on market and product information developed by sensors and magnets,
without being able to understand fully the complexities associated with new markets (Hitt
et al., 1990) or even the complexities of introducing a radical innovation into a large-scale
production process (see below).
General innovation strategy
As noted above, establishing - and allocating resources to - new business units that
must not meet the performance criteria expected of pre-existing units, may lead to
widespread animosity among present operations level managers.

Indeed, magnets

“sidestep the usual approval process designed for investments in operations, not
innovation… A separate pool of internal funds (such as a venture fund) needs to be set
aside to finance them” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 191). At the most general level, CHQ must be
cognizant of the potential for over-innovation resulting from metanational governance, in
accordance with Tallman and Li’s (1996) view that: “…excess product diversification may
harm performance.” In TCI theory terms: the extreme geographical diversification of
knowledge management may reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of internal
organization vis-à-vis the use of the price mechanism in the external market. Here, the
problem is not so much the actual location of sensors and magnets in places previously
unexplored by the MNE, but the fact that learning must occur from locations and markets
“beyond the reach of its operating network” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 90). The significance of
this is the explicit divorce of innovative activity from the operating divisions. For the
sensing activity, the authors make the following comment: “Extending the operating
network to perform the sensing role would be like trying to use a power generation turbine
to do the job of a thermostat.” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 91). In case of strong resistance from the
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operations level to this approach, CHQ may then be forced to push emerging technology
business units entirely outside the main organization (as minority investments) or to deinternalize them altogether in order to satisfy minimum procedural justice requirements in
resource allocation. Irrespective of such resistance, an important driver of selectivity in
innovation is lacking, namely extensive coordination routines from the outset supporting
individuals engaged in R&D and individuals working in production and marketing to
explore continuously the feasibility of implementing and commercializing novel ideas,
instrumental to effective and efficient knowledge management and innovation in its
entirety.
The need for innovation, especially through R&D, as a condition for MNE growth
is well established (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 2007), but according to Penrose, a firm’s
growth is also dependent on its unused productive resources, especially in terms of slack
embodied in the top management team (Penrose, 1959). If the innovation process proposed
by Doz et al. (2001) indeed requires enormous commitments of energy and time from CHQ
managers to bring new solutions to the market, because of an unfavorable internal context
for effective and efficient innovation in its entirety, then this context will itself restrict the
MNE’s growth potential, see Verbeke and Yuan (2007) for a related, in-depth analysis.

Management of incremental versus disruptive innovation
The metanational model is designed to scour the planet for emerging, disruptive
innovations. Instead of relying on incremental product and service improvements, which
would reduce uncertainty, metanational sensors gain knowledge about existing and coming
needs from lead customers and niche markets that may have global appeal. Behaving like
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venture-capital-seeking startups, magnets then devise solutions and accompanying business
plans to generate project funding from CHQ. Projects emerge from all over the world, in
markets unfamiliar to senior managers at CHQs or at the operations level, thus creating
severe bounded rationality problems. Magnet managers can frame opportunity assessments
in function of their own priorities, and thus benefit from CHQ senior management’s
comparative ignorance. Given the priority granted to magnet projects in the metanational,
whereby these projects are not viewed by CHQ as ‘autonomous’ in a Burgelmanian sense
(Burgelman, 1983), with ‘autonomous’ projects typically subject to funding caps in contrast
to ‘induced’ projects, but constitute the essence of the MNE’s innovation approach, severe
bounded reliability problems are likely to arise.

Indeed, these projects actually are

‘autonomous’, i.e., not consistent with the MNE’s dominant logic in a technological or
organizational sense, but only consistent with the metanational CHQ’s cognitive
perspective on what constitutes valuable innovation. A sole focus on such projects will,
when imposed upon the operations level, distract the company from important customers
and acceptable investment returns, thus fostering problems of bounded reliability. Here,
open-ended promises of profitability and growth made by magnets are given more weight
than the experienced voices of managers at the operations level.
In contrast, the multidivisional MNE can also tap into multiple locations for new
innovations through its use of existing divisions, and therefore without incurring the
organizational problems associated with metanational governance. One possibility within
multidivisional governance is attaching importance to Birkinshaw-type autonomous
initiatives, with radical innovations arising at the grass roots in the conventional divisions
and smaller subunits, and resource allocation routines being designed in such a way as to

26

avoid the corporate immune system from kicking in (Birkinshaw, 2000; Rugman and
Verbeke 2001, 2003). Best practices to facilitate autonomous projects potentially carrying
radical innovations, include seed money allocated for such projects, formal requests for
proposals, allowing incubator practices, and developing internal subunit networks
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 2001). Importantly, the above best practices to foster autonomous
projects recognize that the innovation process should be managed in its entirety from the
outset through dedicated routines in existing subunits even if, e.g., setting up incubators
implies sheltering radical innovation activities in their early stages from operational
concerns.
According to Christensen (1997) it is true, historically, that large companies have
suffered from a detrimental inability to see past current customer demands. He also claims
that developing emerging platforms and technologies and catering to lead customers is
problematic in the real world, given the short-term profit expectations of many senior
managers and shareholders. But the metanational may not be the solution. Bhidé (2000)
asserts that non-incremental innovation should be left in the willing and capable hands of
small, growing companies. Both authors suggest that large companies should mitigate risk
by ‘cherry picking’, i.e., the act of acquiring small firms with demonstrated, strong productmarket potential. An alternative to cherry picking consists of taking multiple minority
investment positions in innovative companies through corporate venture capital programs
(Campbell et al., 2003). In fact, Doz et al. (2001, p. 157) acknowledge the use of venture
capital funds as one route to accessing new knowledge. But what Doz et al. (2001) do not
recognize is that, except in a crisis situation, disruptions to well-functioning, operational
divisions should be kept to a minimum.
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The few cases noted by Doz et al. (2001) where operating divisions wholeheartedly
accepted the breakthrough innovations coming from sensing and magnet operations,
include STMicroelectronics, whereby innovative system chips had already proven their
commercial viability as a result of contracting with a few major customers, meaning there
actually was a proven market. Another successful example of innovation arising from
sensors and magnets and being accepted by operating divisions, is the case of the record
company PolyGram, whereby the former units identified innovative content, in terms of
new (foreign) artists with a unique repertoire. Here, acceptance by the operating divisions
was easy to achieve, because no fundamental technical changes were needed in the
production process (Doz et al., 2001, p. 72). However, such cases with ex ante proven
market potential and relatively simple technological adaptation requirements imposed on
the production apparatus are hardly representative of radical innovation.

Discussion and Conclusion
The metanational approach to MNE governance provides a new set of principles
substituting for the conventional multidivisional governance principles to align
environmental characteristics, strategy and organization in firms with high product and
geographic diversification, operating in dynamic settings. The question is whether this new
set of governance principles is likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the
MNEs adopting them.
Our analysis does not establish the supremacy of the metanational governance
principles over the more conventional principles characterizing multidivisional governance.
Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out. Surely, with the increasingly common
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phenomenon of offshoring (which usually entails far less complexity than dispersing
geographically the entire R&D function), it is clear that many MNEs now do learn from the
world, but this usually occurs within the scope of the MNE operating divisions’ mandate to
increase value chain effectiveness and efficiency. Doz et al. (2001, p. 95) explicitly dismiss
this approach as largely irrelevant to metanational functioning where the focus is on new
sources of knowledge as a precondition for radical innovation: “if global sourcing
structures create some metanational advantage, it will be by coincidence and good fortune”.
On the other hand, the authors do advocate the use of networks of outsiders on a grand
scale, throughout the world to gain access to local innovations, but they do not discuss in
depth the problems of bounded reliability to monitor these multiple strategic alliances,
except for the honest observation that it might be dangerous to become too reliant on
outsiders for innovation (Doz et al. 2001, p. 203).
Doz et al.’s (2001) dismissive perspective on global sourcing may be valid for
conventional offshoring focused solely on cost reduction, but it is inconsistent with the
essence of the offshoring story painted by Lewin and Peeters (2006) and Lewin et al.
(2007). These authors predict a further increase in offshoring, driven on the one hand by the
commoditization of many operational processes, but also, increasingly, not by mere cost
considerations but by a need for talent that remains unsatisfied at home, especially the need
for highly skilled human resources capable of product and process innovation. Offshoring
may thus include sophisticated knowledge management and innovation activities but the
success of the intended ‘reverse knowledge transfer’ to the home country and the MNE
network depends crucially upon the management of the innovation process in its entirety,
which fits well with multidivisional governance principles.
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Empirical evidence should, and will, be the ultimate judge of the metanational’s
validity. However, empirical testing hinges on identifying and tracking the success of
companies adhering fully to metanational governance principles; no such firms exist today,
suggesting a predictive failure for now. Perhaps Doz and his co-authors, as INSEAD
international business educators and gurus, will succeed in influencing a sufficient number
of MNE CEOs to engage in this type of transformation, just as Alfred Chandler
undoubtedly stimulated multidivisional governance adoption through influencing his
Harvard Business School colleagues and the School’s alumni.

Highly entrepreneurial

founders of well-funded, globally aspiring startups may also follow suit. While the payoffs
are unclear, our paper suggests that a number of problems associated with adopting
metanational governance principles are not.
Paradoxically, working with sensors and magnets might work best in relatively
simple

organizations,

with

hands-on,

authoritarian

founders/top

managers,

low

diversification levels and traditional functional structures. Here, CHQ executives may
actually still command the product/market knowledge as well as the substantial slack
capacity required to perform the wide array of CHQ activities (including direct supervision
of sensors and magnets) necessary to make the metanational work. If successful, such
metanational CHQ executives, just like their counterparts in the companies adhering to
multidivisional governance principles, can then be expected to introduce mechanisms
geared towards reducing problems of bounded rationality and bounded reliability, and to
create an appropriate context for innovation in its entirety. This may entail, inter alia,
finding stable homes for sensor and magnet units, thereby de facto making them the core of
new operating divisions, as a complement to the existing functional organization. If
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successful, such changes would paradoxically create incentives towards moving from
functional toward multidivisional governance, and - in the case of excessive problems of
internal coordination and control - toward de-internalization.
An alternative is of course simply to outsource completely the operations level,
which is viewed by Doz et al. as a set of activities exploiting pre-existing firm-specific
advantages and reaping the rewards of ‘farming’. In that case, the dynamic selectivity
pursued by CHQ managers may entail replacing the conventional divisions in a
multidivisional approach to governance by sensors and magnets, and specializing the firm
in the activities pursued by the latter. The MNE would ‘sell’ the fruits of its innovation
activities to strategic partners or even to external market participants anywhere in the
world, with the latter actors performing the actual production activities. The key question
would be which economic activities should still be kept inside the firm, a challenge
especially for MNEs from advanced, knowledge-based economies such as the United
States, the European Union and Japan
In any case, the fine-tuning of the metanational approach to governance is likely to
be firm-, industry- and circumstance-specific. It is unlikely that the one approach suggested
by Doz et al. (2001) will work for all companies. As one example, Bill Gates, Microsoft’s
Chairman and Chief Software Architect, recently stated, “We found it easier to do research
in multiple locations than to do product development in multiple locations.” (Ricciuti,
2004). In other words, no firm escapes from the requirement to assess the innovation
process in its entirety: the number and the location of the pools an MNE will fish in will
largely depends on the specific value chain activity considered.
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As for the world’s largest and most diversified MNEs, multidivisional governance
principles are likely to remain compelling. As noted by CEO Jeff Immelt on the issue of
selective CHQ intervention: “When You run General Electric…there are seven to 12 times
a year when you have to say, ‘You’re doing it my way’. If you do it 18 times, the good
people will leave. If you do it three times, the company falls apart” (Nocera, 2007, p.14).
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APPENDIX 1: THREE FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSACTION COST/ INTERNALIZATION
THEORY (TCI) APPLIED TO THE MNE

Bounded rationality reflects the scarcity of the human mind: “…human behavior is
intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1957, p. xxiv). Given a complex and
uncertain environment, economic actors are unable to know, process and act on all current
and future information. Hence, they are unable to produce comprehensive contingent
claims contracts (Arrow, 1974). Economizing on bounded rationality is widely accepted as
critical to both value capture and value creation in the MNE, especially when exploiting the
MNE’s firm-specific advantages, i.e., its proprietary knowledge, which typically exhibits
public goods characteristics (Rugman, 1981; Rugman and Verbeke, 2005b). Economizing
on bounded rationality is also important when contemplating alternative governance
mechanisms for knowledge management; here, the ease of linking the knowledge
exploration process with subsequent production and marketing activities, i.e., the challenge
of effective and efficient innovation in its entirety, is a key consideration.
Bounded reliability reflects the scarcity of making good on open-ended promises: good
faith contractual representations do not always result in the realization of the promised
outcomes or performance milestones due to a variety of factors. Safeguards or enforcement
mechanisms (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) to heighten detection of - and provide
punishment for - reneging are symptomatic.
Importantly, the concept of opportunism, which is a key element in Williamsonian TCE,
and has been criticized as an inappropriate foundation of management theory (Ghoshal and
Moran, 1996), is only one expression of bounded reliability, as assumed implicitly in much
of modern TCI theory and visible in numerous modern cases on MNE management.
Opportunism implies ex-ante false commitments and/or ex-post malevolent reneging on
commitments. In a Williamsonian world, safeguards need to be established to reduce the
probability of opportunistic behavior, and to punish it when it occurs. This is important
both when dealing with outside contracting parties in a situation of small numbers
bargaining and asset specificity, so as to mitigate the risks of cheating, and to reduce
shirking inside the MNE. However, precisely inside the MNE, with managers often
committed to spend a substantial portion of their career within a single company (or at least
within a single industry), with their professional mobility dependent on their reputation, and
with their professional pride to do what is in their mind the best job possible, more common
expressions of bounded reliability may prevail, especially benevolent preference reversal
over time.
Benevolent preference reversal may result from both recurrent, unintentional overcommitment and recurrent ‘local’ prioritization, with the word ‘local’ referring to the main
activities, dispersed in geographic space, for which specific individuals and groups are
made responsible. These problems cannot be simply reduced to opportunism issues.
Commitments requested by CHQ and intentions expressed to CHQ to achieve a particular
outcome/performance level, do not always result in the realization of the promised
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outcome/ performance milestones due to a variety of factors, including the misalignment of
incentives. Absent opportunism, the bounded reliability problem is not that reality turns out
differently from prior expectations (which is a mere bounded rationality issue), but that
individuals recurrently experience (benevolent) preference reversal over time, a wellknown phenomenon in psychology (Steel and König, 2006). For example, at the level of a
division, the divisional manager may typically promise the execution of specific investment
projects in accordance with CHQ preferences, and commit to specific performance
requirements. However, a combination of factors such as a substantial distance in time from
any sanction in case of non-achievement, a substantial distance in space from the
headquarters’ monitoring apparatus, and the relative proximity and intrinsic satisfaction
derived from focusing on autonomous, locally driven investment opportunities with
immediate local rewards such as an improvement of relationships with local stakeholders,
etc. drive preference reversal. This occurs especially if ultimate performance cannot be
appraised objectively and in full (a bounded rationality problem), as is the case when
substantial reciprocal interdependencies exist among various subunits in the organization so
that an individual (or unit’s) performance cannot be measured accurately.
Apart from describing behavioral reality more correctly and fully than the opportunism
concept, there are two additional advantages of adopting the bounded reliability concept:
first, opportunism is a concept reflecting abundance (in terms of propensity to cheat and
shirk), in contrast to bounded rationality. Bounded reliability, as is the case with bounded
rationality, reflects scarcity, in this case scarcity of making good on open-ended promises.
Second, for decades there has been a debate between economists and institutional theory
scholars on the drivers of change: in economics the main driver is increased efficiency; in
institutional theory it is increased legitimacy. A number of empirical articles in business
have attempted to ‘test’ these two alternative explanations for changes in managerial
settings. By building upon the bounded reliability concept, the need for alternative
explanations may in many cases be reduced. For example, historically the relatively slow
diffusion of multidivisional governance, in spite of its proven efficiency impacts (not taking
into account the causal ambiguity problems associated with such a managerial innovation
and the related risk perceptions, nor the possibility of technology-driven rigidities), has
been caused in part by the presence of powerful functional groups, in favor of the status
quo inside large diversified firms. From an institutional theory perspective, powerful
stakeholders considered such a change in governance as illegitimate. From a TCI
perspective, governance change would have increased bounded reliability problems, as the
stakeholders resisting change would have become ‘unreliable’ (reneging on their
employment contract expectations by simply exiting the company or by sabotaging the new
system’s implementation, etc.) thereby reducing the effectiveness and efficiency of the
firm’s functioning. However, when a crisis situation unfolded, and a search process was
undertaken by the stakeholders concerned to find a solution, the new governance form’s
legitimacy increased and the danger of reduced reliability of groups previously opposed to
the new form faded away. In general terms: expected increases in legitimacy of a particular
course of action, such as the choice of a governance form or pattern of behavior, can often
reasonably be interpreted as the equivalent of reduced bounded reliability challenges
originating from stakeholders able to affect the firm’s functioning.
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Favorable organizational context for effective and efficient knowledge management in its
entirety. When penetrating foreign markets, firms must first deploy existing, non-location
bound (or internationally transferable) knowledge in those foreign locations (Buckley and
Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981). Second, in order to be successful there, they must also
engage in investments, permitting the combination of non-location bound knowledge from
the home country with new, location-bound knowledge in specific host countries or
complementary non-location bound knowledge required to operate profitably abroad. Since
both the initial and the recombined knowledge bundles typically have public goods
characteristics, the MNE faces a probability of serious loss, if these bundles are
unintentionally absorbed by external actors, or improperly combined inside the MNE, in
host markets. Third, a more recent phenomenon is the need for selectivity (and resulting
corporate coherence) in the face of easy access to multiple technologies in multiple foreign
locations, meant to create reverse knowledge transfers. Here, the MNE acts as a knowledge
network, with several home and host country operations involved as actors in knowledge
creation and diffusion activities (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001).
Cantwell’s (1995) incisive analysis of MNE technological diversification strategies has
demonstrated that three stages of international knowledge recombination must be
distinguished. The first stage, covering the post World War I era up to 1970, had MNE
foreign subsidiaries engaged primarily in the adaptation of home country knowledge to
host country requirements. Technological diversification (albeit largely incremental) thus
went hand in hand with geographic diversification. The second stage, which lasted until the
mid-eighties, was an era of increased technological interrelatedness, also at the
international level. MNE knowledge accumulation from international sources increased,
partly driven by a reduction in transport and communication costs, and in many cases by
the changing nature of the technological knowledge itself, which permitted its easier
diffusion across sectors and national borders. In the third stage, which is still ongoing now,
new capability creation requires the use of internal networks, with a strong need for
selectivity in the choice of interconnected locations (e.g., ‘higher order’ regions), that
contribute to new knowledge combinations from various sources, see also Cantwell and
Piscitello (1999) and Cantwell and Iammarino (2000). The modern MNE that strategically
integrates complementary knowledge sources from different geographic locations
(Cantwell, 1989) and harnesses multiple technologies (Cantwell et al., 2004) is thus one
that requires even more than before a focus on dynamic selectivity in governance. Even in
the context of ‘asset seeking’ international diversification (Cantwell et al., 2004), whereby
the strong need to manage tacit knowledge and the high potential benefits of learning-bydoing may act as stimuli for internalization, it is important to note that bounded rationality
and bounded reliability challenges, though mitigated through internalization as compared to
the use of market mechanisms (such as technology licensing), are not eliminated
completely (Coase, 1937). Senior managers must monitor and mitigate the effects of
bounded rationality and bounded reliability inside the firm, sometimes making extensive
use of price-like mechanisms, Hennart (1991; Rugman and Verbeke (2003). Importantly,
most of the innovation activity described above in large MNEs occurs within global
product divisions or regional divisions, see, e.g., Rugman (2005)
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Table 1: Multidivisional versus metanational governance
Governance
principle
Specialization in
decision-making
(CHQ versus
divisions)

Multidivisional governance

Metanational governance

Strong:
- CHQ set product/market scope boundaries,
make key resource allocation decisions and
focus on overall organizational performance.
- CHQ limit their intervention in divisions,
except in crisis situations and for large scale,
resource intensive projects.
- Divisions have substantial autonomy within
the boundaries of the product/market scope
determined by CHQ and the resources
allocated to them.

Weak:
- Sensors and magnets benefit from
participative decentralization, but with
continuous CHQ involvement.
- Sensors and magnets have a ‘direct line’ with
corporate headquarters.
- The output of sensors and magnets leads to
continuous CHQ intervention at the operations
level, so as to enforce the obligatory
absorption of ‘valuable’ innovations.

Selectivity in
interdivisional
interactions

Strong:
- Comparatively limited interdivisional communication and exchange.
- Use of an internal price mechanism where
possible in exchange between divisions.

Weak:
- Sensors and magnets interact extensively,
and impose their preferences on the operations
level.
- Price mechanism is avoided where possible,
to stimulate ‘knowledge sharing, melding and
leveraging’.

Incentive systems
for subunits

Standardized:
- CHQ monitor and reward divisions largely
on the basis of (quasi-) standardized,
quantifiable outputs.

Variable:
- CHQ monitor and reward sensors and
magnets according to venture capital approach.
- CHQ monitor and reward the operations
level as with multidivisional governance.

General
innovation
strategy

Sequential and separate roles for CHQ and
divisions:
- CHQ provide guidelines on what constitutes
acceptable areas of innovation.
- Quasi-autonomous divisions act on
innovation opportunities within their mandate
and bear responsibility for the results.

Management of
incremental versus
disruptive
innovation

Focus on incremental innovation:
- Divisions reduce uncertainty by focusing on
incremental innovations that fit current
customer demand.
- R&D, marketing and sales are geared
towards products that fit preset profit margin
requirements.
- Intra-divisional innovation emphasis reduces
complexity.
- Separate routines are set up for ‘induced’ and
‘autonomous’ innovation projects.

Simultaneity and non-separation of CHQ and
subunit actions:
- CHQ review and select ideas based on
business plans presented by multiple sensors
and magnets.
- CHQ impose the commercialization of
innovations coming from sensors and magnets
on the operations level.
Focus on emerging, disruptive innovation:
- Sensors and magnets embrace uncertainty by
focusing on disruptive innovations.
- Sensors and magnets are unconstrained in
their quest for innovation by short-term
profitability requirements.
-Sensors and magnets are unconstrained by
complexity-reduction in term of innovation
alignment with the operations level
- Sensor and magnet innovations are inherently
‘autonomous’.
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